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ABSTRACT This paper characterizes a contract signing protocol with high efficiency in Internet of Things.
Recent studies show that existing contract-signing protocols can achieve abuse-freeness and resist inference
attack, but cannot meet the high-efficiency and convenience requirement of the future Internet of things
applications. To solve this problem, we propose a novel contract-signing protocol. Our proposed protocol
includes two main parts: 1) we use the partial public key of the sender, instead of the zero-knowledge
protocol, to verify the intermediate result; 2) we employ two independent Trusted Third Parties (TTPs)
to prevent the honest-but-curious TTP. Our analysis shows that our double TTP protocol can not only result
in lower computational cost, but also can achieve abuse-freeness with trapdoor commitment scheme. In a
word, our proposed scheme performs better than the state of the art in terms of four metrics: encryption time,
number of exponentiations, data to be exchanged and exchange steps in one round contract-signing.
INDEX TERMS Contract-signing protocol, abuse-freeness, double trusted third parties, trapdoor commit-
ment scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoT) has been called ‘‘the next Industrial
Revolution’’ because of the rapid growth and how it’s chang-
ing the way people live, and interact. However, we might
not be ready for this technology improvement because of the
trust issue. A recent study had found that less than 4 out
of 10 business owners are confident that their organization
have implemented perfect user privacy protection infrastruc-
ture. Therefore, to protect users’ privacy when purchasing
such IoT applications, online contract signing protocols are
necessary. For example, if a customer needs to subscribe an
E-journal, an online contract is required to be signed by
the customer and the IoT supporter, and thus, these smart
device help you connect to the journal company. However
the involved parties may not trust each other if they are
strangers to each other. Hence a fair contract-signing pro-
tocol is necessary. The protocol’s main property is fairness.
Intuitively, it means at the end of the protocol, both parties
either have valid signatures or none, even if one of them
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Xiaojiang Du.
tries to cheat or the protocol interrupts for some reasons.
The second property is timely termination, which is to avoid
infinite waiting. Both of the two properties are also crucial
in fair exchange, certified e-mail, and fair nonrepudiation
protocols. The last property is the abuse-freeness, which was
introduced by Garay et al. [1]. Abuse-free means if the proto-
col is not executed successfully, none of the involved parties
have the ability to show the validity of intermediate results to
a third one.
As mentioned above, the core of contract-signing protocol
is how to make distrusted parties fairly exchange digital items
over the public network [2], [3]. Till now, there are many
related researches. Asokan et al. [4] proposed a security
model for the problem of exchanging digital signatures fairly.
Bao et al. [5], [6] described a protocol for fair exchange
of electronic data between two parties with off-line TTP.
Many relevant work about fair exchange is proposed, such
as certified e-mail protocols [11]–[13], nonrepudiation pro-
tocols [14], authentication protocols [15],and e-payment pro-
tocols on the internet [11], [16].
Contract-signing protocols can be classified into three
types: 1) protocols without TTP, 2) protocols with online TTP,
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3) protocols with offline TTP. In [8], [17], authors described
the protocols without TTP, in which both parties exchange
their signatures ‘‘bit by bit’’. If one side terminates the
protocol, both of them have the same fractions of the peer’s
commitments. Free from TTP is a strong advantage of these
protocols, since TTP is a bottleneck of contract-signing
protocols. Nevertheless, their shortcomings are also evident.
Firstly, the two involved parties should have the same com-
putation capacity. Otherwise the participant who has stronger
computing power has more benefit than the other one. Sec-
ondly, the efficiency of computation and the exchange during
the protocol’s execution is low, so that is far from to meet the
requirement of real situation. For instance, if Alice and Bob
(for convenient, we call the senderAlice and the receiver Bob)
are resigning a protocol by TTP-free, whenever any of the
two participants terminates prematurely, both of them can still
complete the exchange offline by exhaustively searching the
remaining bits of the signatures. Therefore, it is impractical
formost real-word applications although this approach enjoys
the great advantage of being TTP-free. Moreover, both the
computation and communication costs of such protocols are
high.
The protocols with online TTP [7], [8] are much
simpler and more efficient, since a TTP facilitates the exe-
cution of the signing process. Under the online TTP setting,
a TTP acts as a mediator between two involved parties.
However, The main issue of the online TTP protocol
is that TTP is likely to become a security and perfor-
mance bottleneck. Furthermore, the TTP could be rather
expensive with its frequent involvement in each step.
Thus, the efficient of online TTP protocol is low, espe-
cially in the system where there is a large number of
participants.
Compared with the previous two schemes, researchers
are more prone to the contract-signing protocols with an
off-line TTP [16], [18], which are much more practical in
most applications. The reason is that the TTP is not invoked
in the execution of the protocol unless one of the parties
misbehaved or the protocol was interrupted for some rea-
sons. Park et al. [16] proposed an approach for constructing
fair-exchange protocols. They employed RSA-based multi-
signatures to construct efficient optimistic protocols. In this
protocol, the signer splits a RSA private key into two parts
and keeps both parts while the TTP keeps just one part.
Although the protocol is fair and optimistic, the biggest
problem is the vulnerability of inference attack. That is,
the honest-but-curious [19] TTP can easily figure out the
signer’s secret key. Dodis and Reyzin [20] showed that the
informal connection between non-interactive fair exchange
and secure two-signature schemes can be formalized, and
provably secure fair exchange protocols can be created. They
employed the gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) groups. However,
in their scheme, the pairing computation consumes too much
time and performance could be hindered, even though a
number of papers have investigated the pairing computation
improvement [9], [21].
Moreover, the two schemes in [20] and [16] mentioned
above have a common shortcoming, i.e. they are not abuse-
free. If a signer Alice can prove to an external party that she
is able to get verifiable intermediate results when protocol
is unsuccessfully, we say the protocol is not abuse-free. For
instance, Alice wants to buy a house from Charlie. At the
same time, Bob is selling another house. Alice could first ini-
tiate a contract with Bob. Then she terminates the execution of
the contract-signing protocol after obtained the intermediate
results generated by Bob. As a result, Alice could make a deal
with Charlie in a lower price by showing such universally-
verifiable proofs to Charlie. We say it is not abuse-free.
To solve this problem,Wang [22] proposed a contract-signing
protocol for two mutually distrusted parties based on RSA
multi-signature. The author integrated an interactive zero-
knowledge protocol [23], which is proposed for confirm-
ing RSA undeniable signatures to prove the validity of the
intermediate results. To realize the abuse-freeness property,
he exploited Symmetric Encryption [24] and trapdoor com-
mitment scheme [25] to enhance the zero-knowledge proto-
col. However, due to the above strategy the exchange requires
four more steps and the frequently exchange will reduce the
protocol’s efficiency although this scheme is abuse-free and
fair.
To improve the efficiency of former researches, a new
contract-signing protocol is proposed for two mutually dis-
trusted parties in our work. The key contribution of this paper
are:
• Our contract-signing protocol employs double offline
TTPs. The two offline TTPs are invoked only when the
dispute arise. By this offline TTPs structure, the protocol
can meet the optimistic property requirement.
• Our protocol is both abuse-free and efficient, because
it employs the trapdoor commitment scheme. In more
detail, previous research [22] employed the zero-
knowledge, which needs more steps so that is not effi-
cient enough. Therefore, double TTPs are applied to
substitute zero knowledge protocol and hence improve
the efficiency of our proposed contract-signing protocol.
• In order to avoid inference attack, we also use partial
private/public keys to make the two TTPs independent.
By this method, the protocol is able to prevent the
honest-but-curious TTP from acquiring the private key
of the users.
• Unlike protocols with single TTP, our double TTPs
scheme can prevent an attacker from stealing the partial
private key d2 saved by TTP. In our scheme, every TTP
just have a part of d2, i.e. d2or d22. Therefore even
though the attacker obtains one of d21 and d22, he cannot
get valid d2.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
describes the related work about the contract signing protocol
such as Park et al.’s, Wang’s schemes, as well as the trapdoor
commitment scheme. Section 3 introduces our trapdoor com-
mitment scheme based on the RSA signature, which is sig-
nificant for attaining abuse-freeness. Then, the security and
VOLUME 7, 2019 174741
G. Xu et al.: DT-CP: Double-TTPs-Based Contract-Signing Protocol With Lower Computational Cost
efficiency is analyzed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 gives
the conclusion.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, Park et al.’s [16] and Wang’s [22] protocols
are introduced in detail. After that, we discuss the trap-
door commitment scheme. Park et al.’s scheme is based on
RSA signature. In this scheme, the private key is split into
two parts. First, Alice generates her RSA public key. She
sets two primes p and q which are two k-bit safe primes.
Then she can get an RSA modulus n = p · q and calculates
her private key d = e−1mod φ(n), where φ(n) = (p − 1)
(q − 1) is Euler’s totient function. After that, Alice registers
her public key by the certification authority (CA), and the
certification authority return a certificate. Alice needs to split
the private key d into d1 and d2 randomly. Note that d1
and d2 satisfy d = d1 + d2mod φ(n), where d1 ∈R Z∗φ(n).
Afterwards Alice computes e1 = d−11 mod n and e2 =
d−12 mod n. In order to get voucher VA from the TTP, Alice
needs to send (CA, e1, d2) to the TTP. After that, the TTP
checks CA, e1, and d2. If all those verification go through,
the TTP returns VA to Alice. In the exchange phase, Alice
computes σ1 = h(m)d1mod n, and sends (CA,VA, σ1)
to Bob. After verifying the CA and VA, Bob returns σB.
In last step, Alice sends σ2 to Bob, then Bob obtains
σA = σ1 + σ2.
Unfortunately, the protocol is not safe enough because the
inference attack that an honest-but-curious TTP can derive
Alice’s private key. More specifically, the TTP knows that the
integer e − (1 − ed2)e1 is a nonzero multiple of φn. We call
this problem inference attack in the following section. In that
case, Alice’s RSAmodulus n can be easily factored so that the
TTP can get Alice’s private key d by the extended Euclidean
algorithm. Besides, the protocol is not abuse-free though it is
fair and optimistic.
Wang [22] improved the Park et al.’s protocol. He proposed
an abuse-free contract-signing protocol with zero-knowledge
protocol. In Wang’s protocol, the initiator Alice also ran-
domly splits the private key d into d1 and d2, i.e., d = d1 +
d2mod φ(n). Then, she sets p = 2p′+1, q = 2q′+1, n = pq.
At the same time, she generates a sample message-signature
pair (ω, σω), where ω ∈ Z∗n\1.− 1. And then, she sends
(CA, σω, ω, d2) to the TTP but keeps (d, d1, d2, e1) as secrets.
The TTP first checks if the triple (CA, ω, σω) is prepared cor-
rectly. After that, TTP stores d2 securely. Then TTP creates a
voucher VA, and sends it to Alice. In the signature exchange
protocol, Alice firstly sends (CA,VA, σ1) to BOb. After Bob
receives the secret, he sets c = σ 2i1 σωωmod n c is a challenge of
the trapdoor commitment and Bob can verify the availability
of the σ1 by zero knowledge protocol without e1. Due to
zero knowledge protocol, neither Bob nor TTP can obtain e1.
So the honest-but-curious TTP cannot derive the private key
of Alice by e − (1 − ed2)e1, i.e. the reference attack is
avoided. Although Wang’s protocol is fair, optimistic, abuse-
free, secure and of anti-inference attack, it is not efficient
enough, since the trapdoor commitment and zero knowledge
protocol require four more exchange steps in the signature
exchange phase.
In our scheme, double TTPs are used to prevent the infer-
ence attack. But double TTPs are not enough to ensure the
abuse-freeness of the protocol. Therefore, the trapdoor com-
mitment scheme is also adopted, but this method is employed
in a different way. Now we introduce the concept of trapdoor
commitment in advance.
A commitment scheme is a basic cryptographic model
in the field of cryptography. This model can be considered
to be a sealed envelope. If one party, for example Alice
wants to commit a message M , she can put M into a sealed
envelope. Whenever Alice would like to publish M , she just
needs to open the envelope. Generally speaking, commitment
scheme should satisfy the ‘‘hiding property’’ and the ‘‘bind-
ing property’’. The former one means that no one can get
any information aboutM from the envelope except for Alice.
The later one means that Alice cannot change M after she
has made the commitment, and she cannot cheat the receiver
since the receiver can verify whether Alice has committedM .
Trapdoor commitment [26]–[28] is a commitment scheme
with special properties, that is, one with the trapdoor key can
open his commitment in different ways. In other word, given
the trapdoor key, this trapdoor commitment does not satisfy
the binding property as traditional commitment schemes.
Hence, if the receiver is the owner of the trapdoor, he can
change the message which has been committed. Due to this
property, a third party cannot make sure that the answer
is the real one revealed by the sender. Actually, thanks for
the property that a third party cannot verify the availability
of intermediate results, our protocol can satisfy the abuse-
freeness. A trapdoor commitment (TC) consists of four parts,
TC = (TCgen, TCcom, TCvrfy, TCsim). TCgen is the gen-
eration algorithm, which is responsible for generate a key pk
and a corresponding commitment for the receiver. Actually,
the receiver is the owner of the TC. TCcom can output a pair
(C, t) for the input (pk, r), where value C is the commut-
ment and value s is the related information to decommit C .
Given an input C , related information t is the related infor-
mation to decommit C . Given an input pk , commitment C ,
related information t and message M , verification algorithm
TCvrfy can check whether a pair (r, t) is valid to the given
commitment C . The simulate algorithm TCsim allows the
receiver to simulate a ‘‘fake’’ answer (r ′, t) for the given
commitment C while one answer (r, t) has been given. For-
tunately, the trapdoor commitment used in this protocol can
be find easily. In [18], [27] the author reported how to con-
struct trapdoor commitment scheme from RSA assumption,
while [18], [29] is a discrete log(DL)-based instantiation
using a free trapdoor commitment scheme, which can be used
in the Schnorr signature, EIGamal signature, or DSA, etc.
So, no matter which kind of public key published by the
receiver, at least one trapdoor commitment scheme can be
used. From what we mentioned, we know how to prevent
TTP from deriving Alice’s private key with the knowledge
of (n, e, e1, d2). In Wang’s protocol, Alice hides the partial
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public key e1 from the TTP and Bob, replaced with the zero-
knowledge protocol to prove the availability of σ1 . In this
paper, we propose a more efficient scheme without losing
abuse-freeness and fairness.
III. IMPROVEMENT ON TRADITIONAL CONTRACT-
SIGNING PROTOCOL USING DOUBLE TTPS
In this section, we describe our contract-signing protocol
with double TTPs, which satisfies the following cardinal
principles of the contract-signing protocols [16], [22].
• Fairness: fairness is the fundamental property of the
contract-signing protocol, since the first task of a
contract-signing is to ensure the fairness between users.
In this point, fairness means both of the two parties
have the same advantages. If one of them cheats, he/she
cannot acquire any benefit from the other one.
• Optimism: In this scheme, we adopt two off-line TTPs,
which are awaked only when one party is cheat-
ing or other disputes arise. However, disputes are rare
incidents due to the fact that the cheater cannot get
any benefit. We call the property of the offline TTP
Optimism property.
• Abuse-freeness: in contract-signing protocol, we need
to ensure that any of the two parties cannot show the
validity of the intermediate results to outside parties
when the protocol executes unsuccessfully. In this paper,
we realize abuse-freeness by using the trapdoor commit-
ment scheme.
• Timely Termination: This property implies that the pro-
tocol defined a deadline T. If one of the parties does not
send his signature after T, the other party does not need
to wait, and both of them can be free from the protocol.
• TTPs’ Statelessness: In this protocol, our double TTPs
do not need tomaintain a database to search or remember
the state information. Because of this property, the bur-
den of the TTPs is reduced and the cost of the TTPs will
much lower.
• High Efficiency: In [22], the protocol execution in a
normal status requires seven steps. Our scheme is more
efficient because just three rounds are required in the
exchange protocol. In most instances, the protocol exe-
cutes in the normal status. Therefore, if we reduce the
steps of the exchange protocol, the efficiency can be
greatly improved.
The main process of our protocol is showed in Figure 1.
The sender Alice first executes the registration protocol to
register with the double TTPs. She splits her private key d
into d1 and d2, where d = d1 + d2 mod φ(n). Further-
more, Alice sequentially splits d2 into d21 and d22 satisfying
d2 = d21 + d22 mod φ(n). After that, d21 and d22 are respec-
tively delivered to the TTP1 and TTP2, while Alice keeps
(d, d1, d21, d22) as secrets. At the same time, Alice sends
e1 to TTP1 and TTP2. After that, TTP1 computes the trap-
door commitment r1 = TCcom(e1, t1), and TTP2 computes
r2 = TCcom(e1, t2), where t1 and t2 are the related infor-
mation to decommit the commitment r1 and r2 respectively.
FIGURE 1. The general frame of contract signing protocol with double TTP.
Note that the commitment r1 and r2 depends on Bob’s
signature, which can commit to the partial public key e1.
To exchange her signature σA = h(m)d mod n with Bob’s
signature, Alice needs to execute signature exchange protocol
with Bob. In this sub-protocol, Alice first sends her partial
signature σ1 = h(m)d1 mod n, r and (e1, t) to Bob. Then, Bob
checks e1 committed by double TTPs so that he can verify
whether σ1 is available. Finally, Bob sends his signature σB
to Alice because he is sure that he can obtain the second
partial signature σ2 from TTP1 and TTP2. Generally speak-
ing, we assume that the communication channel between
Alice and Bob is unreliable, i.e., the message transmitting
in this channel may be lost due to the failure of computer
network or attacks. Nevertheless, the channel between the
involved parties and TTP is reliable, i.e., the message will be
delivered to the recipient after a finite delay.
A. REGISTRATION
To exchange digital signatures, the initiator Alice is required
to register to TTPs, so that she can get the vouchers V1
and V2 from double TTPs, and a certificate CA from CA.
The voucher can be regraded as a kind of certificate for the
registration steps. The registration protocol is briefly illumi-
nated in Figure 2, and the detailed procedure is elaborated as
follows.
1) In the general RSA key generation process, Alice first
sets a RSA modulus n = pq, where p and q are two
k-bit safe primes. For instance, she sets two primes p′,
q′, and the safe prime satisfy p = 2p′+ 1, q = 2q′+ 1.
After that, Alice randomly selects her public key e ∈R
Z∗φ(n), and calculates her private key d = e−1 mod φ(n),
where φ(n) = (p−1)(q−1). At last, Alice registers her
public key to a CA for a certificate CA, which includes
her identity and her public key pair (n, e).
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FIGURE 2. Registration protocol.
2) Aice first splits d into d1 and d2 randomly, and then
splits d2 into d21 and d22. Meanwhile, she generates
a sample-signature pair ω, φω, where ω ∈ Z∗n \
1,−1, ord(ω) ≥ or ≥ p′q′, σω = ωd1 mod n.
Finally, Alice sends (CA, e1, ω, σω, d21) to TTP1 and
(CA, e1, ω, σω, d22) to TTP2.
3) TTP1 and TTP2 checks whether Alice’s certificate CA
is valid and σ e1ω ≡ ω(mod n) or not. If yes, TTP1
computes σd21 = ωd21 mod n, and sends σd22 to TTP1.
4) TTP1 and TTP2 check whether σω is constructed cor-
rectly by verifying the following congruence relations:
ω = σ e1ω mod n, σ eω · (σd21 · d22)e ≡ ω(mod n).
If the verification is correct, both TTP1 and TTP2 accept
Alice’s claim that the congruence relations of e1 · d1 ≡
1(mod φ(n)) and (d1 + d21 + d22) · e ≡ 1(mod n)
hold. Then, TTP1 stores d21 and TTP2 stores d22
securely. Meanwhile, TTP1 generates a commitment
r1 = TCcom(e1, t1) and TTP2 generate a commitment
r2 = TCcom(e1, t2) by selecting a random number
t1 and t2, in which t1 and t2 are the related informa-
tion used to decommit the trapdoor commitment r1
and r2. As the aforementioned trapdoor commitment
scheme, the TCcom is the commitment algorithm of
a secure trapdoor commitment scheme which depends
on Bob’s public key. After that, the two TTPs gen-
erate their voucher V1 and V2 respectively, by com-
puting V1 = signTTP1 (CA, ω, σω, r1, t2) and V2 =
signTTP2 (CA, ω, φω, r2, t2). At last, TTP1 sends V1 and
TTP2 sends V2 to Alice.
We give some notes on the registration parts mentioned
above. In step (1), Alice gets her certification from a CA so
that she can prove that the modulus is the product of two
safe primes. In fact, if Alice has obtained CA from CA, the
step (1) can be omitted. After Alice sends (CA, e1, ω, σω, d21)
to TTP1 and (CA, e1, ω, σω, d22) to TTP2, the two TTPs verify
ω ∈ Z∗n \ {1. − 1}, and ensure both gcd(ω − 1, n) and
gcd(ω + 1, n) are not prime factors of n. After step (3),
Alice proves to TTP1 and TTP2 that she knows the discrete
logarithm of σω to the base ω without revealing d1. This
can be done via the zero-knowledge protocol in [30]. Finally,
once the verification of step (4) is passed, TTP1 and TTP2
generate the voucherV1 andV2 respectively for theAlice. The
registration part above just needs to work only when the first
FIGURE 3. Signature exchange protocol.
time Alice executes the protocol, and the vouchers generated
for Alice can be used to the next contracts. Therefore, Alice
can fairly sign contracts for a long period.
B. SIGATURE EXCHANGE
When Alice and Bob initiate the protocol, We assume that
Alice and Bob have gone through a negotiation on the con-
tract M , which may contain the identity of Alice and Bob,
and contain the double TTPs, as well as the deadline T. The
signature exchange protocol is depicted in Figure 3.
1) First, the initiator Alice generates her partial signature
σ1 by computing σ1 = h(m)d1 mod n. Then she sends
the seven tuple (CA,V1,V2, σ1, e1, t1, t2) to Bob, which
is committed by TTP1 and TTP2.
2) After receiving (CA,V1,V2, σ1, e1, t1, t2) from Alice,
Bob is required to verify that CA is the real certificate
of Alice. Then, Bob checks if the identity of Alice, Bob,
and TTP are correctly descripted corresponding to M .
3) Bob also checks whether V1 is signed by TTP1 and V2
is signed by TTP2. Then Bob needs to decommit r1 and
r2 via the trapdoor commitment verification algorithm
TCvrfy. Bob is required to check r1 = TCvrfy(e1, t1)
and r2 = TCvrfy(e1, t2). If the verification returns
true, Bob can confirm that e1 is the real partial public
key of Alice. Then, he verifies the partial signature σ1
by checking h(M ) ≡ σ e11 (mod n).If the verification
is correct, Bob computes σB = h(M )dBmod n, and
sends his signature σB on contract M to Alice, since
he is convinced that another partial signature σ2 can be
released by the double TTPs, in case Alice might refuse
to do so.
4) Upon receiving σB, Alice checks whether it is Bob’s
valid signature on contract M . If it goes well, Alice
sends her partial signature σ2 to Bob by computing
σ2 = h(m)d2mod n. While Bob obtains σ2, he checks
whether h(m) ≡ (σ1σ2)emod n. If the equation holds,
Bob can get Alice’s standard RSA signature σA on
message M from σA = (σ1σ2)emod n. On the contrary,
if σ2 is not be successfully received by Bob, or Alice
cheats during the protocol, Bob can turn to the dou-
ble TTPs. We explain more detail on the above signa-
ture exchange protocol in the following section.
Firstly, the trapdoor commitment scheme in step (3) is sig-
nificant in the exchange part. For one thing, the trapdoor
commitments committed by TTP1 and TTP2 is used to verify
174744 VOLUME 7, 2019
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TABLE 1. Property Comparison.
the validity of e1 in case that Alice might forge a fake e1. For
another, it also enhances the security of the above verification
of σ1. Specifically, using a commitment scheme can prevent
Bob from forwarding the intermediate results to convince an
outsider of the validity of σ1. Because of the special prop-
erty of the trapdoor commitment, Bob cannot collude with
one or more outside parties by leaking Alice’s partial public
key e1. Actually, the trapdoor commitment scheme relies on
Bob’s public key, but it requires some extra parameters, i.e.
s and u. In [29], the two parameters of trapdoor commitment
should be given by receivers. However, in [18], [26] the
parameters s and u are set before the protocol’s execution.
In our protocol, the parameters also can be set as a fixed
value, e.g. s = 2 and u a fixed 160-bit prime number, for all
receivers who employ RSA signatures. In this way, the two
TTPs who only know the receiver Bob’s RSA public key can
run the trapdoor commitment scheme without asking for the
parameters from Bob. Last but not least important, although
Alice is required to register with the TTPs, Bob does not need
to do so due to that the double TTPs do not need to conserve
Bob’s identity information.
C. DISPUTE RESOLUTION
After Bob submits his signature σB to Alice, he may not
receive the Alice’s signature σ1 or may receive invalid signa-
ture from Alice. If the dispute arises, Bob can turn to TTP for
assistance before the deadline T for the Alice’s valid partial
signature σ2 via dispute resolve protocol. This protocol is
shown in Figure 4 and more detail is depicted as follows.
1) Bob first sends (CA,VA1 ,M , σ1, e1, σB) to TTP1 and
(CA,VA2 ,M , σ1, e1, σB) to TTP2 . Later, TTP1 checks
whether CA and VA1 are Alice’s valid certificate and
voucher on contract M . Besides, he also verifies the
availability of Bob’s signature σB. Meanwhile, TTP2
checks the availability of CA, VA2 , and σB like TTP1
does. If the verification is correct, the two TTPs need
to check the contractM to make sure that the deadline T
contained in contractM is not expired and to make sure
that both the sender Alice, and the receiver Bob are the
right parties specified in M . If any of the verifications
mentioned above fails, TTP1 and TTP2 send errors to
Bob.
2) Ater that, TTP1 computes σ21 = h(m)d21 mod n. Then
TTP1 sends σ21 to TTP2. Upon receiving σ21 from
TTP2, TTP2 sends σ22 to TTP1. Whereafter, TTP1 and
TTP2 can compute σ2 = σ21σ22 mod n. Accordingly,
FIGURE 4. Dispute resolution protocol.
they can check whether h(m) ≡ (σ1σ2)e mod n. If this
equality holds, TTP1 and TTP2 send (M , σ21) and
(M , σ22) to Bob respectively. Simultaneously, both of
the two TTPs send (M , σB) to Alice. However, if the




The proposed scheme satisfies several security properties
shown in Table 1. We compare our scheme with recently
proposed schemes. Obviously, the table demonstrates that our
scheme satisfies the proposed six properties, overperforming
the other four previous researches. In the following section,
We discuss the critical part of the security properties of our
protocol in detail.
1) ABUSE-FREENESS
First, we specify the abuse-freeness. During the signa-
ture exchange protocol, after Bob received (CA,V1,V2, σ1,
e1, t1, t2) from Alice, he is required to check whether e1 is
valid via the trapdoor commitment verification algorithm
r¯1 = TCvrfy(e1, t1) and r¯2 = TCvrfy(e1, t2). However,
if Bob wants to sell the partial signature σ1 to another party
Charlie for some benefits, he might hardly success. If Charlie
gets σ1 with the proof (CA,V1,V2, σ1, t1, t2), he needs firstly
check the availability of e1 by r¯2 = TCvrfy(e1, t1) and r¯2 =
TCvrfy(e1, t2). But actually, Bob could use the trapdoor td to
simulate new answers (e1′, t1′) and (e1′, t2′). On this occasion,
Charlie cannot confirm whether e1 is a valid partial public
key of Alice. Therefore, Bob is not able to convince Charlie
that σ1 is a real partial signature of Alice. It means that our
contract-signing protocol is also abuse-free even we do not
use zero knowledge protocol like Wang [22] did.
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2) ANTI-REFERENCE ATTACK
Furthermore, our protocol also avoids inference attack vul-
nerbility in Park et al.’s protocol [16], which is pointed out
by Wang. That is, if Alice is honest, an honest but curious
TTP can derive Alice’s private key d from d2 due to that
e− (1− ed2)e1 is a nonzero multiple of φ(n). It is dangerous
if anybody except for Alice herself has Alice’s private key d .
Because an attacker may steal the private key by a variety of
approaches from the one who knows d , e.g. TTP, but Alice
is ignorant of anything. In our protocol, we assume that the
two TTPs are independent and do not collude with each other.
Alice divides the partial private key d2 into d21 and d22 so
that each of the two TTPs just has a part of the d2. Since
we assume mutual collusion does not exist between the two
TTPs, neither TTP1 nor TTP2 can obtain the complete d2.
Hence, they cannot derive Alice’s private key d by inferring
from the integer e− (1− ed2)e1. In addition, the deadline T
embedded in the contract M is a reasonable predetermined
value. The protocol should not be terminated beyond the
deadline T. Therefore, if the dispute arises, the receiver Bob
must recall the two TTPs before T. If the protocol expires,
each involved party is free of liability. Actually, after the
deadline T, TTP1 and TTP2 will not accept any dispute
resolution request about previous protocol. On this account,
Bob has to awaken the double TTPs before deadline T in case
that the time expires but the disputes are not solved.
3) FAIRNESS
Except for the above discussion, fairness is a vital portion of a
contract-signing protocol. In the following parts, we mainly
discuss the fairness property in our contract-signing proto-
col. Fairness here means that any of the involved two parties
cannot take advantage of the other one even though one of
them cheats during the exchange protocol. This property can
be divided into two points. For one thing, Alice is an honest
one, but Bob is a cheater. For another, Bob is an honest
one, but Alice is a cheater. We will analysis the fairness
from the two contrary points. In the first place, we assume
that Alice is honest, but Bob cheats. Note that Bob or any
other adversary cannot forge the σ1, σ2 and M. Therefore,
only Alice herself can generate a valid σ1 and σ2. Similarly,
nobody can generate σ21 and σ22 except for Alice and the
two TTPs. In the signature exchange protocol, Alice first
sends (CA,V1,V2, σ1, e1, t1, t2) to Bob. When Bob receives
σ1, he is required to decide whether send σB to Alice. If Bob
does not send his signature σB or send an invalid signature to
Alice, Alice will not return σ2. In that case, Bob certainly
cannot obtain Alice’s signature σA. Then, if Bob executes
the dispute resolution protocol before deadline T, he has to
send his signature σB to TTPs in order to get σ2. Eventually,
both Alice and Bob can get the other’s signature on M .
In addition, we assume that Bob just lie to one TTP but honest
to the other one, for example, he sends an invalid signature
to TTP1 but sends the valid signature σB to TTP2. In that
case, Bob can only get σ21, but cannot get σ22, so that he
cannot obtain σA. However, TTP1 will send (σB,M ) to Alice.
Obviously, no matter which TTP Bob cheats, Bob cannot get
any benefit.
In another case, we assume that Bob is honest, while
Alice is a cheater. For example, in step (2) of the registration
protocol, Alice sends an invalid partial public key e1′ to TTP1
and TTP2. The double TTPs need to check whether σω is
valid in advance by zero knowledge protocol [30]. If the
verification goes through, the two TTPs check whether ω ≡
σω
e1 ′ (modn). Eventually, the two TTPs cannot send vouch-
ers to Alice because ω 6= σωe1 (modn). Besides, if Alice
sends an invalid partial private key d21′ and d22′ to dou-
ble TTPs respectively, she cannot pass the verification in
steps (4), since σ eω · (σd21 ′ · σd22 ′ )e 6= ω(modn). In addition,
if Alice cheats in the signature exchange protocol, e.g. she
does not send her partial signature σ2, Bob can execute the
dispute resolution protocol. From what we discuss before,
we can conclude that our contract-signing protocol does not
favor to any parties. Namely, our protocol satisfies fairness.
B. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND COMPARISONS
In this section, the perfomance of our protocol is analyzed in
the normal case, i.e., the operation of the dispute resolution
protocol is not included. Moreover, we add the encryption
time and the exchange frequency as new criteria, which is
not mentioned in Park’s and Wang’s work. We evaluate the
efficiency of our scheme in terms of four criteria:
• encryption time of every encrption scheme in signature
exchange protocol.
• Number of modular exponentiations required for signa-
ture exchange protocols by Alice and Bob.
• Size of the data to be exchanged.
• Number of exchange steps in one round contract-
signing.
Note that we assume the length of RSA modulus n
is 1200 bit, and that the hash function h(·) has 256-bit
fixed output. We can easily calculate the size of the data
to be exchanged in the signature exchange subprotocol.
As in Figure 5 item ‘‘encryption time’’, we can see that
the data size of our protocol is much smaller than Alawi’s
scheme, and almost equal to Bodkhe’s and Wang’s scheme.
Whereas, Park’s scheme is smaller. It is because Park did
not adopt the commitment scheme so that fails to realize
the abuse-freeness property. Actually, our protocol need to
exchange smaller data than Wang’s and the others with-
out losing the abuse-freeness. In order to clearly compare
the encryption overide between the others’ work and ours,
we made a simulation encryption experiment to compute the
encryption time of the protocols(shown in Table 2). As the
table shows, the TTP involved scheme cause extra computa-
tional overhead, i.e. Bodkhe et al.’s work since this scheme
needs TTP’s participation in each signature exchange. For
a more precise comparison, we simulate the cryptographic
oprations mentioned in the Table 2 using a pycrypto cryp-
tographic library. In addition, we assume that the symmet-
ric encryption are implemented by the SHA-256. As shown
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TABLE 2. Encryption time of protocols.
FIGURE 5. Efficiency evaluation in four criteria.
in Figure 5, the Park et al.’s scheme takes 10.7915ms and
B.Bodkhe’s scheme needs 15.926ms. Especially, the Wang’s
takes 19.834 and Alawi’s take 22.594, which are twice of us.
It clearly denote that, except the Park’s scheme, the proposed
scheme causes much more computational overhead than
ours.
Note that the most computationally expensive crypto-
graphic operation is modular exponentiation in the finite
field Zn. So, we take the number of modular exponentia-
tions as the computational cost. Similar to Wang’s scheme,
we assume that σB could be generated and verified by
one modular exponentiation separately, as in [22] and [16].
Figure 5 item ‘‘Exponentions time’’ compares the num-
ber of exponentiations between the proposed scheme and
ours. Obviously, our scheme needs less exponentiation than
Wang’s, Bodkhe’s and Alawi’s.
Except for the mentiond criterion, the number of exchange
steps in one round contract-signing is a fourth criterion,
which is different from the others’ scheme. Because it can
directly influence the efficiency of the protocol, the infor-
mation translation would consume more time during the
protocol execution. Figure5 item ‘‘Exchange Steps in Once
Contract-signing’’ shows the comparison of exchange steps
between our protocol and other RSA-based protocols. In gen-
eral, our scheme improves the efficiency of Wang’s protocol
without losing the excellent property, i.e. abuse-freeness and
security.number of exchange steps in one round contract-
signing in our scheme is decreases by 57% compared with
Wang’s scheme. In other word, there are only three exchange
steps in our scheme in normal case, which is much less than
seven exchange steps in Wang’s scheme.
What need to be explained is that Park’s scheme seems
to be more outstanding than ours in the four criterion. But
actually, this scheme has some shortcomings. For example,
it did not realize the abuse-freeness in this scheme. That is,
the receiver Bob can easily prove that he has the ability to get
the intermediate product of sender Alice in this protocol since
he did not adopt trapdoor commitment scheme. Moreover,
Park et al. did not resolve the inference attack mentioned
before, while our scheme completely solves the problem via
double TTPs. From the above, we can say that our scheme
outperform the others’ schemes except for park’s as shown
in Figure 5, but does not have the significant vulnerability in
Park’s scheme.
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V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, a novel contract-signing protocol with two
TTPs is proposed for Interent of Things in higher efficiency
and convenience. Like the existing RSA-based solutions,
our new protocol is fair and optimistic. Namely, both of
the two involved parties have valid signatures of the other
one or neither does, and the two TTPs are only involved
when dispute arise occasionally. Furthermore, our protocol
employs trapdoor commitment to achieve abuse-freeness and
adopts double TTPs to resolve the security risk which we
called inference attack. By this way, the interactive zero-
knowledge protocol is not required. Therefore, our protocol
merely needs three exchange steps in the normal case, rather
than seven steps in Wang’s scheme, and hence improves the
efficiency. In addition, our approach has other advantages.
Note that the two TTPs are stateless in our contract-signing
protocol, because it does not keep any state information
regarding to each protocol instance. Moreover, our protocol
can cooperate with coverless information technology [31]
and automatic network management [32], [33] in fair pay-
ments of e-commerce. Based on this, we can set online
bank and the market administrator, e.g. Amazon or eBay,
as two TTPs. One customer purchases goods from a mer-
chant via internet by paying digital check. Our proposed
protocol can improve the efficiency and convenience in such
Iot-transactions.
Finally, our protocol allows two potentially mistrusted par-
ties to exchange their signatures with double TTPs. However,
the protocol should be extended for the scenario of multiparty
in order to satisfy more requirement in real life. Besides,
though the double TTPs is honest, hidden dangers are also
existing, i.e. collusion attack, since the two TTPs can collu-
sively get partial private key d2 of Alice. Therefore, we could
try to hide the d21 and d22 or using the proxy private key to
prevent the collusive attack.
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